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Summary  findings
About 20,000 early childhood development centers  A high cost for child care discourages households
provided day care for and prepared for primary school  from using formal child care facilities and has a negative
more than  1 million children aged three to seven  effect on mothers' participation in market work.
(roughly 20 percent of children in that age group) in  *  The cost of child care and the level of mothers'
Kenya in 1995. The number of child care facilities  wages affect older children's school enrollment, but these
reached 23,690  by the end of 1999.  factors affect boys' and girls' schooling differently. An
Lokshin, Glinskaya, and Garcia analyze the effect of  increase in mothers' wages increases boys' enrollment but
child care costs on households' behavior in Kenya. For  depresses girls' enrollment.
households with children aged three to seven, they  * Higher child care costs have no significant effect on
model household demand for mothers' participation in  boys' schooling but significantly decrease the number of
paid work, the participation in paid work of other  girls in school.
household members, household demand for schooling,
and household demand for child care. They find that:
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About 20,000 early child development (ECD) centers provided day care and prepared for primary
school over 1 million children three to seven years old (about 20 percent of the children in this age
group) in Kenya in 1995, and the number  of child care facilities  reached 23,690 by the end of 1999.
The number of ECD centers increased 500-fold between 1963 and 1995 as a response to a
rising involvement of women in the labor market and an increase in the number of single-parent
households. Analysis  of the 1995 Kenya Welfare Monitoring  Survey shows that 30 percent of rural
households  in Kenya  are headed by women, and over half of all prime-aged  (15-45 years old) married
women work in salaried occupations. The popularity of ECD centers also stems from the belief that
participation  in ECD programs improves children's chances in primary school entrance  exams and
leads to lower dropout rates (Kipkorir and Njenga 1993; Myers 1992).
The government's  annual expenditures  on ECD programs can exceed its expenditures  for one
year of primary education, according to various estimates  in developing countries (Wilson 1995).
Such expensive investments  in small children compete  for resources with many other programs and
projects,  and it is important  to provide  policymakers  with information  that allows them to judge which
interventions  are most beneficial (Gaag and Tan 1999).
The effectiveness  of investments  in ECD programs  is often estimated  based on improvements
in the future  productivity  ofECD graduates.  Growing  evidence  from diverse cultures shows  that most
ECD programs  of relatively  good quality  have meaningful  short-term  effects  on cognitive  ability,  early
school achievement, and social adjustment  (Reynolds et al. 1997).2  These direct improvements  in
child outcomes are the benefits that policymakers  usually consider when making decisions about
public investments  in ECD. At the same  time, the availability  of affordable ECD facilities may offer
indirect benefits (Myers 1996).  Among these are increased  participation of mothers in market work
and increased  school participation  of older siblings  (usually  young  girls) who are freed  from the child
care chores. The impact of these benefits on the welfare of households with small children can be
2 There  is also  increasing  evidence  that  interventions  can  produce  medium-  to longer-run  effects  on
school  achievement,  special  education  placement,  grade  retention,  disruptive  behavior  and delinquency,  and
high school  graduation  (Reynolds  et al. 1997).substantial. Freeing mothers for market work may improve household income status, and since
households with young children and female-headed households tend to be poorer, increased in
availability of ECD services is expected to help alleviate poverty.
Research in the developing countries indicates that other than the mother females in the
household, especially young daughters, act as providers of free child care, releasing mothers for
market work (Pitt and Rosenzweig 1990; Wong and Levine 1992; Tiefanthaler 1997 ; Connelly,  De
Graph, and Levinson 1996; Deutsch 1998).  Skoufias (1994) studied intrahousehold time allocation
in India and established that time spent in school by girls and boys is negatively correlated with the
mother's wage rate, suggesting  that mothers' time and older children's time at home are substitutes.
Deolalikar (1998) examined determinants of primary and secondary enrollment among Kenyan
households and found a high income elasticity of secondary school enrollment. He also found
significant  differences in girls' (but not boys') primary  and secondary  enrollment  by the presence of
children under three in the households. The author reports a particularly strong effect for girls of
secondary  school age. Conditional  on the other  determinants  of enrollment,  the probability  that a girl
aged 14-17 is enrolled in secondary school is reduced by 41 percent if there is a child under three
years of age in the household. The corresponding  effect for boys is only 5 percent. These results
suggest that when the market child care services  are unavailable, owing to high cost or a lack of
facilities, older siblings of young children are more likely to provide child care.
To date only a few studies - for example,  Connelly,  De Graph, and Levinson (1996), Wong
and Levine (1992), Lokshin (1999) - have researched the relationship between child care and
women's labor market activity in developing  or transitional  countries. Nearly all of these found that
the price of child care has nontrivial effects on women's work patterns. The results of this paper
fiurther  contribute  to the understanding  of the interdependency  of households' decisions about labor
supplies of its members, child care arrangements  and schooling, and suggest policies that lead, in
words of Summers (1992), to investing in all the people. Summers  emphasizes that the money  spent
in developing countries to educate girls is far more productive than any other social sector outlays.
This paper develops a simple theoretical framework  of household utility maximization that
yields empirically testable implications for the relationship between the price of child care and
household  behavior.  We  test these  hypotheses  byjointly  estimating  a system  of  reduced-form  equations
of the demand for quality of child care, schooling  for older boys and girls, and leisure of the mother
2and other household members using the method of Semi-Parametric Full Information Maximum
Likelihood.  This method  takes into  account  the error term correlations  between the household  demand
equations.
The estimations reveal that mothers' decisions about participating in the labor market are
sensitive to changes in both wages and the cost of child care. Higher wages that mothers can earn
outside the home encourage them to enter the labor force, while higher-cost child care suppresses
maternal employment.  Households' decisions about  young  children's participation  in ECD programs
are found to be very sensitive to the cost of care. Higher-cost  child care discourages households  from
using ECD programs. Both maternal wage rates and cost of care effect school enrollment of school-
age children. The influence of these factors on households' decisions about its children's schooling
is determined by a combination of income and substitution effects. An increase in mothers' wages
raises school participation of boys; in this case the income effect dominates the substitution effect.
But the mothers' wage increase depresses the school enrollment of girls; in this case girls substitute
for the mother in home production. Higher prices for child care have no significant effect on boys'
schooling and significantly decrease the number of girls at school.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data, and section 3 presents
descriptive  statistics on the main outcomes of interest and their factors of influence and describes  the
system of early childhood development centers in Kenya. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, show the
development  ofthe theoretical  model, give details ofthe empirical  model, and discuss the conceptual
issues involved in estimating a consistent model of household child care choice, schooling  and labor
supply. Section 6 presents and discusses estimation and simulation results. Section 7 concludes  with
a discussion of the policy implications and a summary of the findings.
2. Data
The data for  this research  come from two sources.  The 1994  Kenya  Welfare  Monitoring Survey  (WMS
II) provides  information  on 10,860  households  (59,200 individuals),  including about  6,624 households
with  children between ages three and seven. The survey is based on the multistage sampling
3framework drawn by the National Sample Survey and Evaluation Program. 3 The survey includes
questions on the modes of child care arrangements  made for the children in the household, and the
amount of money paid for formal child care. The part of the questionnaire administered to each
individual  household member yields data on each household member's labor activity and earnings.
The part of the questionnaire  administered to one respondent  per household on matters that affected
the household collectively  yields information  on nonwage  household income and on the household's
composition.
Information  about  child care facilities  was collected by  the Kenyan  Ministry  of Education  with
the help ofthe World Bank in 1995.  A survey  was conducted on a sample  of more than 800 child  care
facilities in 17 districts or urban centers in Kenya, representing urban, pastoralist, and other rural
areas. The Kenya Early Childhood  Development Centers Survey (KECDCS) is a stratified random
sample that represents  each ofthe sponsorship types in the country.  The survey collected information
on the center's location, enrollment,  operating expenditures,  financial status, and facilities. Data on
the characteristics  and salaries of teaching and nonteaching staff, the extent of turnover, and child
feeding practices were collected. For more infornation  about the sample selection procedure and
descriptive statistics of the sample, see Mukui and Mwaniki (1995).
There is no direct way to match the data from these two surveys.  However, WMS II provides
exact geographical  coordinates  for most households  in the sample, and the addresses of the surveyed
child care facilities were registered in KECDCS. The geographic coordinates of the towns in which
the ECD centers are located were determined using a gazetteer maintained by the U.S. National
Imagery and Mapping Agency. 4 The same source was used to identify the location of some of the
households for which no location information was available in the survey. We identified the
administrative  district in which each  household and ECD center is located  by using a so-called  point-
in-polygon operation in a geographic information system. 5
3WMS  II was  designed  to cover  the  remote  and low-density  northen  districts  but was  not fully
successful  in getting  information  in those  areas.
4 The information  is available  at  http://164.214.2.59/gns/html/index.html
5  The digital  map  of Kenyan  districts  that we used  was  produced  by the International  Livestock
Research  Institute  in Nairobi,  Kenya.
43. Descriptive analysis
Household child care choice and members' labor supply in Kenya
A household's decision about the labor supply of its members is determined to some degree by
comparing members' productivity  at home and in the labor market. Small children require constant
care,  and a mother's productivity  at  home is in many  cases  higher  than her potential  return  from  outside
work. Table 1 shows the proportion of mothers working in cash occupations (henceforth working
mothers or employed mothers) by the number of children zero to six years old and by age of the
mother. For all age groups the percentage of working mothers declines with the number of small
children in the household. The employment  rate of young mothers (age 18 to 25) is lower than the
employmentrate  of the mothers  from older age groups.  Most economically  active  are 26- to 35-year-
old mothers.  Among  them the  rate of employment  reaches  46 percent for women with one child,  which
is comparable  to or higher  than  the proportion  of working  women  with no children.  In households  with
four or more children below age six, only about 25 percent of mothers work for a wage.
Table 2 presents data on the percentage of working mothers by the household size and by
mother's age group. The higher the size of the household, the lower the probability  that the mother
works. Again, as in Table 1, the most active group of mothers is the women 26-3  5 years of age from
small families.  These  are  probably single  mothers  with small children. For single-mother  households
the proportion  of  working mothers  is consistently  high, with more  than 80 percent ofthe women  with
children age 26-3  5 participating  in the labor market. Without other adult household members, such
households may depend more heavily on market-provided  care. Older mothers with small children
tend to work less.
Adult household members other than the mother, especially nonworking members, may
participate in household production and substitute for the mother as child care providers when she
works. Table 3 shows the probability of households' sending their children to ECD centers by the
number of elderly in the household. The data indicate that the more members of older age are  present
in the household, the less likely it is for the child to attend a center.
The labor force participation rates of women with children are lower than they are for other
population groups.  Table 4 shows the levels of employment for the various age-gender categories.
5Rates of employment  of men in all age categories in Kenya are significantly  higher that the rates of
employment for women. About 70 percent of men in 26-35 year old category work, compared with
only 33 percent of women with children in  the same age category. The level of labor force
participation  is declining for older age groups,  and for the respondents older than 45 years old twice
as many men as women work outside  home.
The ECD system in Kenya
Kenya has a long tradition of preschool education.  The first privately run preschools appeared in the
1  940s, catering  exclusively  to the European  and Asian communities. Later, day care centers became
established on coffee, tea, and sugar plantation and in urban centers. The expansion of preschools
happened after independence in 1963.
In the mid-1990s the majority of ECD centers in Kenya functioned as community-operated
programs. The other types of early education and care centers were established and run by religious
organizations,  private individuals and companies, plantations,  estates, NGOs, and local authorities.
Altogether, they represent about 40 percent of all centers in the country.
An organized  curriculum  for Kenya  ECD centers was  not established until the late 1980s.  By
the mid-1990s, the central government assumed responsibility for training preschool teachers,
supervising and inspecting preschool programs, and developing a locality-specific curriculum.  All
but the local government-run centers rely heavily on fees for paying their day-to-day operating
expenses. The majority of ECD funds are spent on teacher salaries.
The  prices  charged  by  ECD programs vary considerably.  Fees are not set nationally,  but rather
by village or urban dwelling parent-teacher associations. Fees vary depending on the quality of
preschools. Centers  that employ  more educated  teachers, have smaller classes, and provide food and
other enhancing  activities  charge  higher  fees (Glinskaya  and Garcia 1999). Land,  buildings, furniture,
and teaching and playing  materials  are  donated  by churches,  local authorities,  and parents  themselves.
64. Theoretical  model
The analysis  applies  to households  with young  children. We assume  that there are four forms  of child
care available to households in Kenya: child care provided by the mother, child care provided by
other adult household members, child care provided  by older siblings, and formal (paid) child care.
For households  with children and two parents, the husband is considered  a potential provider of free
child care.  In a household with a single  mother who has no relatives  living with her, it is assumed  that
any informal child care is provided by children themselves or relatives who live outside the
household.
The theoretical  model used in this paper is based on the assumption  that household members
make choices about their consumption  of child care quality, quality of children's schooling,  market
goods, and leisure. A household's decisions about the quality of child care and education for its
children and about  the amount of time each member of the household can work are motivated  by the
desire to achieve the highest level of household welfare.
The  model is made  tractable  through  a number  of simnplifying  assumptions. First, it is assumed
that children  require continuous  care.  Second,  the household structure  and the number  of children are
assumed  to be exogenous 6. Third,  it is assumed  that  household  members  derive utility  from the quality
of child care they choose. This utility is represented by the discounted value of a potential
improvement  in children resulting from a higher quality of child care or by the current utility of the
family knowing that their children are in competent hands. Fourth, it is assumed that household
members  derive utility  from the education  of children of school age.  This utility  may be thought  of as
benefits that parents  receive from well-educated children in the form of, for example, support in old
age and the satisfaction  of having educated  children.  Fifth, we assume that the total time available  to
children of school age can be divided into time spent caring for younger siblings and time spent on
schooling. Sixth, it is assumed that mothers spend all their free time on child care - that is, the
mother's leisure time equals the time she spends caring for children.
6 This  is a restrictive  assumptions,  however,  work  by Blau  and  Robins  (1988)  and Conelly,  et. al.
(1997) suggest  that treatin the fertility  decision  as endogenous  does not significantly  change the results on
household child care modes and household  members' labor force participation  decisions.
7In the one-period  utility mraximization  problem the household chooses its consumption of a
Hicksian composite  good G,  the quality  of child care Q,  the quality of education  S, the leisure  time of
the mother L4, and the leisure time of other household members Lo subject to its budget and time
constraints. The household utility function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and
quasi-concave:
MaxU  = U(Lm,Lo,G,Q,S)-  (11)
The total quality of child care Q is a function of the exogenous quality of the child care provided by
the mother Q m , the exogenous quality of care provided by siblings Qs, the quality of child care
purchased on the market Qp,  and the exogenous quality of child care provided by relatives Qo:
Q =Q(Qm,Lm,Qp,Q.o,T  Q5,Ts),  such that Q'>O  and Q"<O  (1.2)
where To  is the time other household  members  spend  on child  care and T, is the time that older siblings
spend on child care.
The education production function is defined to be  a continuous, twice continuously
differentiable  function S of the time children spend at school:
S = S(1 - T,-), such that S'  >  0 and S " < 0 (13)
The budget  constraint  includes total household  expenditures  on child care as a function ofthe number
of children in the household, the per-unit quality price of child care, the quality of formal care, and
the time children spend in care:
G =  E +  WmHm  + W,H.-N  Pq  Qp(Hm-To-T),  (1.4)
where E is the exogenous nonwage household income, Hm  is mother's time at work, Ho  is the other
household members' work time, N is the number of children ages three to seven years old in the
household, Pq  is the exogenous price per unit of quality of formal child care, Wm  is the market wage
available  to the mother, WO  is the market  wage available  to the other  household members, and the  price
of the composite good G is taken as a numeraire.
Finally,  under the assumption  that children  require constant  care, the model specifies the  time
constraints  affecting the mother, the other household members, and the children:
Lm+H  H  =L 0 +H,+  T  =S+Ts  =1  (1.5)
H.  - T.-T,  > O  (1.6)
o < T,,,  H,, T, S,L  L_ H_ < 1  (1.7)
8The household simultaneously  solves  its utility  maximization  problem for an optimal consumption  of
all goods that enter into the household utility function.
The structural  form household  demand  equations  can be derived  from  the first-order  conditions
(FOC) ofthe household utility  maximization  problem (1.1-1.7).  The structural  form demands  are the
functions of both endogenous and exogenous variables:
H.  = Hm.(Q,Ho,Wm  . EW  ,  W,  )  HQ=  0'Q(H,S,Ho  Wm  (1.8)
S=(Hm,QH,rWmsWosEsPq  E  Ho  Ho(Hm,SiQ,Wm,Wo,E,1%s)
Solving  the FOC with respect to L,,,  Lo,  Tw,  Ts  and Qp,  the reduced-form  demand system for child  care
and schooling,  the mother's labor supply, and the labor supply of other household members can be
derived as a function of the exogenous variables. The derived reduced-form demand functions are
then:
H.=  Hm(Wm,W.,E,Pq,  Q  Q=  Q(W1%  W,E, Pq*  (1.9)
S = S(Wm,W, EJP,- )  Ho = H(.(W.9W.,E,Pg  )
The next section develops  an empirical  model and discusses specifications  for possible estimations
of the household demand systems.
5. Empirical model and specifications
We specify  a linear approximation  ofthe system of  household  demand  equations  (1.8) and (1.9).  They
are (substituting  H,, Q, S, and Ho on four variables D,'s):
D, =  JX  +  alPq  + a 2 1Wl  + a22*o  + Ei  =  ...4,  (2.1)
where X is a vector of explanatory variables, p  and a's  are vectors of pararneters, and e, is an
equation-specific  disturbance.  Forthe structural  demand  system  (1  .8)Xwould include  both exogenous
and endogenous  variables, and for the reduced-form  demand equation system (1 .9)Xwould include
only exogenous variables. We separate wages and child care price from other explanatory  variables
in equation (2.1) because we use predicted values (hat on the top) for these variables obtained from
the different estimations.
The error terms e,  of equation (2.1) are likely to be correlated.  The demand for each particular
good is an explicit function of other endogenous  variables in the system in the case of the structural
form equations,  and the error terms are  correlated  even in the reduced-form  demand  system  equations
9In the data we do not observe actual household demand. What we do observe are the binary
indicators  (demand index  functions)  that correspond  to the latent  demand  variables  and are  in the form:
Di=l  if  D, >O
D, = 0 otherwise,  i = 1...4  (2.2)
There are  several options for estimating  the system  of equations  (2.2). These  range from ordinary  least
squares to estimating  the fully simultaneous system of equations when each equation in the system
includes  as explanatory  variables the dependent variables  from the other  three equations.  The  first two
methods  we describe  below fall into a category  of unconditional  demand estimators, as they estimate
demand for every  good unconditional  on other  choices, while  the last  method estimates a conditional
household demand system.
The simplest estimations  of the demand system can be obtained by using binary  technique  -
for example, a linear probability  model or binary  probit estimation. However, this method imposes
an assumption of independence of the error terms between the system of equations (2.1). The
coefficients estimated by four independent  probits will be unbiased  but inefficient in a general case.
It is possible to estimate the  household demand system  by specifying  ajoint distribution  ofthe
error terms in (2.1). For example,  under an assumption  ofjoint normality of the distribution of error
terms, the system of equations (2.1) can be estimated by Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML).
Finally,  the structural form of the household demand system can be estimated as a system of
simultaneous  equations,  a so-called  conditional  demand  system.  This approach,  however,  presents  two
major problems. First, it is very hard to find and to justify a choice of identifying  variables. Second,
in the case ofthe fully  simultaneous system  of equations  with binary dependent  variables, there exists
a problem of logical consistency (see, for example, Maddala 1983, p. 214) that makes it impossible
to estimate this system of equations without imposing restrictive assumptions that may have no
economic interpretation.
Thus, the best estimation method in this situation is the estimation of the reduced-form
household demand system  under an assumption  that all error terms in equations (2.2) are correlated. 7
7This estimation  method allows  us to account for the unobserved  variables,  uncorrelated with  the
explanatory  factors,  to influence outcomes.  For example, the presence  of mothers' siblings in the area of
residence  or the existence of neighbor-help  groups, while uncorrelated with  the explanatory  variables,  can
have an effect on all outcomes of interest.
10For  estimation  we use the Semi-Parametric  Full Information  Maximum  Likelihood  (SPFIML)  method
developed  by Laird (1978), and Heckman and Singer (1984), and applied to simultaneous  equations
by Mroz and Guilkey (1992), and Mroz (1999). The method allows us to estimate the system of
simultaneous  binary  equations  without  specifying  an exact functional  form ofthe  joint distribution  of
the error  terms e,  and approximating  these  distribution  non-parametrically.  The method  should  provide
more efficient estimators than FIML in a general case and is far less computationally  expensive.
To account for possible error correlations we impose a factor structure on the disturbances
in equations (2.1):
£ii  pfj +  ' V  +P2YiV + p3iV  X  i = 1...N,  j  = 1  ...  4  (2.3)
where i is a household index,  j  is an equation index, N is a total number of observations, [2 is an
independent extreme value error. VI, V 2, and V3 are common factors among the equations. These
factors are unobservable variables that influence the choices made by households and that are
uncorrelated  with the explanatory  variables. pI, P2, and p3,  are factor  loadings  that represent  the effect
of a given factor in each equation. We introduce a three-factor structure to account in the most
unrestricted form for the possible sources of heterogeneity in the disturbances. 8
We assume that the distributions of the v's in equations (2.2) may be approximated by the
following step functions:
Pr(VI  =Vlk)  =  Pk ,  Pk  2 0 and  E  Pk  1  (2.4)
k=1
Pr(V2 =V 21)  =  P,  PI 2 0 and  P =1  (2.5)
1=1
M
Pr(V 3 =  V3m) =  Pm. Pm  > 0 and ZP m = 1  (2.6)
m=1
where v's are the points of support in the distribution of the factors,  P's are the probabilities  that the
factors  take value v, and K, L, and Mare the numbers of points of support of the distribution of each
factor.
Then the likelihood function describing the mother's labor force participation decision,
younger children's child care mode, older children's school participation, and other household
members' work decisions is given by:
8 For  a discussion  of the  choice  of the optimal  number  of factors,  see Anderson  and  Rubin  (1956).
11NLg  K  L  M  4  >
r  =  L  PRz(xzbzlVk  VI, V,  (2.5)
i=l  ksI  1=1  M=I  z=1 
where  the probability  terms,  denoted  by PRz(.),  are the cumulative  distribution  functions  for every
demand  index  function,  and  N is the total number  of observations  in the sample.
Choosing  a priori  numbers  of  points  of support  K.  L, and  MA  the log-likelihood  function  Z§  is
maximized  over  ,B's,  p's, Ps, and  v's. For  identification  purposes,  the  two  points  of support  for  both
factors  are  normalized  to equal  0 and 1, respectively. 9 The number  of  points  of support  is increased
until  the difference  in the log-likelihoods  of consequent  maximizations  satisfies  the convergence
criteria. 10 The variance-covariance  matrix  e of the estimated  coefficients  in the model  (2.1-2.2)  is
estimated  by  approximating  the  asymptotic  covariance  matrix  by  so-called  "sandwich"  estimator  (see,
for example,  Davidson  and MacKinnon  1993,  263).
Dependent  variables
Summary  statistics  for the dependent  variables  of the system  (2.1) are shown in Table 5. The
definitions  of dependent  variables  are the following:
Mother's  workstatus:  We  define  as  households  with  a  working  mother  the  households  where
a mother  is reported  to be working  for cash and  receiving  wages.  More han half of the households
with small  children  have  working  mothers.
Household  use ofchildcarefacilities: The  households  where at least one ofthe children aged
three  to six are in ECD  centers  are classified  as the households  that use paid child  care facilities.
About  18  percent  of households  use child care  facilities  as a form  of day  care for their children.
9 The  functional  form  for the normalization  of probability  weights,  the points  of support  for  the
likelihood  function  (7),  and the estimated  parameters  are given  in the Appendix.
10  We  use a likelihood  ratio  X2 -test  at a significance  level  of 25%  to determine  the  rejection  or
acceptance  of the model  with  one point  of support.  If  the model  without  heterogeneity  is accepted  in favor
of the  model  with  the control  for unobserved  heterogeneity,  no further  search  is done.  If the simple  model
specification  is rejected, than we perform a x2 'test  for whether to accept or reject the two points of support
specification  versus  a three  points  of support  model,etc.
12Household school participation: The indicator dummy variable is equal to  1 for the
households where all children of a school age  were attending  school; otherwise  this dummy  variable
is equal to 0. About a quarter of Kenyan  households have at least one school-age child not in school.
Working  status of other household members: Households  with working "other household
members" are those where at least one adult household member is reported to be working for cash
wages. Seventy-five percent  of households are classified as households with  working "other
members" according to this definition.
Explanatory variables
The definitions and descriptive  statistics for the explanatory  variables in the system of equations  (2.2)
are presented in Table 5. Several key variables of interest are discussed in detail below.
Price per quality unit of child care (P):  We identify the effect of child care prices on
household behavior through district-level  differences  in these prices. There are two main sources of
information about the child care prices. First, on the household level, information about total
household expenditures on child care for the last month is available from the WMS II. Second, fees
charged by day care facilities were reported in the facility questionnaire collected in KECDCS.
Ideally, we would like to have child care prices from the ECD centers that are in the choice
set of every  household. Neither source of prices provides us with such information. The household
expenditure on child care is endogenous to the child care prices and represents the price in only one
child care facility, chosen by the household. The child care facility survey clearly does not cover all
ECD centers in a particular area, and only about 75 percent of the district surveyed  by the household
survey is covered by the facility survey. In this research we use both approaches to child care price
estimation and compare the results based on the different measures.
Estimating  care prices  from the household expenditures  on child care, we, following  Blau  and
Robins (1988), Blau  and Hagy (1998) assume  that the price per unit of quality of child care is uniform
within a district'" and use the average district-specific  household expenditure as a proxy for the child
care price.
The  average  prices  of child  care are  calculated  for 43 districts.
13To calculate the price of care based on the information on centers' fees, we estimate the
quality-adjusted price of outside-home care using the method suggested by Blau and Hagy (1998).
KECDCS collected extensive information  about  the characteristics  ofthe child care provided  and the
fees charged. These data are used to estimate a model of fees for formal child care facilities. The
quality-adjusted price of an hour of child care is determined by a location-specific hedonic price
equation:
p  =  nk  +P  Xi  +  Ei
where Pi is the price of the formal care at the ECD center, x, is a vector of variables that represents
the characteristics  of the facility, p  is a vector of coefficients,  E,  is an error term. In that specification
ltk  can be interpreted as a market-specific, quality-adjusted, hourly price of ECD program in the
location k.
We use the quality-adjusted price of care to compare the effects of price on household
behavior for facilities that offer different quality of care. For example, suppose one facility offers
several developmental programs and has a low teacher-child ratio. In other words, that facility
provides a high quality of child care but charges a relatively high price for its services. The other
institution  does not offer such high quality of care, and the price it charges  is low. Directly comparing
the prices of these two facilities is not possible because these prices are charged for different
services. The methodology suggested above allows us to adjust prices for differences in the quality
of provided care and thus makes these quality-adjusted  prices comparable.
Mother's offered wage (Wi): The wage rates available to each mother have been imputed
using Mincer's (Mincer and Polachek 1974) type earning function regression with a control for
selectivity.  2 We  use the SPFIML  approach  described  above as an alternative  to the standard  Heckman
correction procedure. This semi-parametric method allows us to  relax an assumption of joint
normality of the error term of regression and selection equations. The method is applied to a
subsample  of women working in cash occupations. Monthly earnings  have been calculated  as a ratio
12 Regression  coefficients  for  the wage  equations  are shown  in Appendix  2. For identification  in the
selection  equation  we use lagged  district-specific  unemployment  rates,  calculated  from  the 1992  Kenya
Welfare  Monitoring  Survey.
14of the reported  women's earnings  and the number of months she worked during the period of time for
which she chose to report her earnings.' 3
In the wage regression,  the following  explanatory  variables  have  been  used to predict mothers'
monthly earnings:  the mother's  educational level, her age,  the number of children she had (as a proxy
for work experience), her marital status, and the number of year she spent in her current main job.
Imputations are made based on the women's predicted monthly earnings with the job tenure of
nonworking  mothers  being equal  to zero. Here  the offered  wage is assumed to be a wage that a mother
could earn if she were to start a new job.
Offered wages of other household members  (Wd: The wage rates available to other
household members are calculated similarly to the wage rates available to mothers. Different
regressions  were run to predict wages for household  members of different ages and genders.  After  the
imputations,  two methods were used to obtain  the wage WO.  Under the first specification  the offered
wage of other household members is equal to the lowest potential wage that can be earned by any
household member  except the mother. The second specification  uses  the average potential  wage that
can  be earned by adult  household members except  the mother  as an explanatory  variable  in the model.
Nonwage household income:  Nonwage incomes  are measured  as householdmonthly income
from all sources  other  than wages. We divide  the total household nonwage income into  two parts. The
first measure includes income from agricultural sales, and the second one includes income from
business activities, pensions, other transfers, and the other incidental income.
Other explanatory  variables include the mother's age and her level of education,  household
size and demographic  composition, and the number of children from various age groups,  as well as
the average level of wages in the district.
6. Results and simulations
The results of the estimation of the system  of simultaneous  equations  (2.2) by SPFIML  are presented
for the specification  with three points of support for each of the three common factors in the model.
Further increasing the numbers of points of support did not significantly increase the value of the
1 3If a woman,  for example,  reported  her earnings  for week,  these  were adjusted  to a monthly  basis.
15likelihood function. The estimated coefficients are shown for the model estimated with and without
adjusting for unobservable heterogeneity and correlation of the error terms. The estimation of the
model without adjusting for a possible correlation in the error terms between equations (2.2) is
essentially a joint yet independent estimation of four probits.
The equation for the older children's schooling  in both SPFIML  and independent  probits cases
is estimated only for the sample of households that have school-age  children. The contribution  to the
likelihood function from this equation for the households with no school-age children is set equal to
unity when four equations are  estimated simultaneously,  and households  without school-age children
are excluded from the estimation in the case of independent probits.
Tables 6(a) and 6(b) present the estimated coefficients for the specification ofthe model (2.2)
where we use the average local household expenditure on child care as a proxy for the price of child
care. According  to the likelihood-ratio  test criterion,  the independent  specification is rejected in favor
of the SPFIML estimation. 1 4
Both SPFIML and independent  probits estimations show that the price of care has a negative
effect on maternal employment. The higher the potential market wage rate of the mother, the more
likely the mother will participate in the labor force. Mothers from single-parent households,  younger
mothers, and mothers from households where the education of the head is higher are more likely to
work.
The results of the estimation indicate that a high price of care decreases the probability that
the household will use outside-home  care.  Households  where the mother  has a higher market wage  rate
are significantly more likely to use paid care. The number of children in a household is negatively
related to the household's likelihood of using ECD centers. Here, one explanation could be the
existence  of some economy of scale based on the number of children that increases the productivity
of other household members at home. In other words, once someone  is taking care of one child, they
can take care of two, whereas if the household put these children in a child care center it would have
to pay double the price. An important finding is that the presence of older children has a significant
14 The log-likelihood value for the independent  estimates is -11672.12 based on 164 parameters.
The log-likelihood  value for the SPFIML  estimate is -11327.38 based on 182 parameters. This is an
increase of 344.74 in the log-likelihood  value for 18 additional parameters.
16negative effect on the paid care use. This fact may support the hypothesis that older children act as
substitutes  for the mother in home production and particularly  in child care.
The probability  that school-age  children attend school is negatively  and significantly  related
to the price of day care. Higher wage rates for mothers have a positive, although statistically
insignificant,  effect  on the likelihood  of  children's attending  school.  The presence of children  younger
than two years of age in the household and the presence of siblings of school age also decrease the
probability that children are at school. A higher level of education of the household head and
education of the mother have a positive effect on children's school attendance.
The estimation of the model in which we approximate costs of child care through quality-
adjusted prices in the locality is shown in Table Al  in Appendix (the calculation of the quality-
adjusted prices is done using the hedonic regression method described above). The estimated
coefficients  of this specification  are less precise than the coefficients  estimated by the first method.
One explanation for this may be the fact that we managed to merge only about half of our household
sample - 3,846 observations  out of 6,645 in the whole sample  - with the information  from the child
care facility  survey. The households that were matched with the child care facilities were located  in
urban areas of Kenya, and some selection  bias may exist in the estimation results. For that reason we
based our simulations in the next section on the first specification.
Nevertheless, the behavior of the main variables of interest in this model confirms the
predictions of the model based on the average local household expenditure on child care. Mothers
with higher potential market wages are more likely to work. The effect of wages on maternal
employment  is significant.  Higher costs  of child care  prevent  mothers  from working  outside  the  home,
decrease  the  probability  that school-age  children  attend  school, and  decrease  the probability  that small
children attend preschool.
Simulations
To examine the effects of the estimates summarized  above on the model (2.2), we simulate how
households would respond to changes in the specific parameters used in the model. In a given
simulation,  a certain value of the variable  of interest is assigned to all the households in the sample.
The simulated probabilities are generated for each household by integrating over the estimated
17heterogeneity distribution and averaging the probabilities across the sample. Next, the value of the
variable of interest is changed, and this changed value is assigned  to the entire sample of households.
Then the new set of simulated  probabilities is generated.  The effect of the changes in the particular
parameter is calculated as the difference in these simulated probabilities.
The results of SPFIML simulations' 5 of the effects of the main variables of interest on
household behavior are shown in Table 7. A 10 percent increase in the mother's potential wage rate
would encourage mothers to work. The proportion of households with working mothers would
increase from 53.1 percent to 62.3  percent, which corresponds  to an elasticity of mother labor supply
with respect to the market wage of 1.48.16  This increase in wages has a strong effect on children's
attendance in paid  child care  facilities. The  proportion of households  using preschool facilities  would
rise by 7.7 percent, indicating that households  treat child care as a "normal good" and increase child
care consumption with an increase in income. School participation  is also positively correlated  with
mothers' wages. A 10 percent increase in wages would result in about a 3 percent increase in the
proportion of households  that send all of their school-age children to school. Changes in the market
wages of women with children have a rather small effect on the labor supply of other household
members.
The simulated effect of a 10 percent increase in the cost of child care is consistent with the
predictions of the theory. Maternal rates of labor force participation would fall, small children's
attendance  in paid child care would decline,  and the percentage  of households with children at school
would also drop. The effect of an increase in child care cost on other household members' labor
supply is small.
It is informative  to simulate a policy of fully subsidized  child care. The results of simulation
are shown in the bottom part of Table 7. Free child care would result in a fourfold increase in the use
of ECD center facilities by Kenyan households with children 17. This high elasticity suggests that
" The results  of the simulations  based  on the independent  probit  estimations  are shown  in Table  A2
in the Appendix.
16 Dabalen  (2000)  reports  the elasticity  of women's  labor  supply  with  respect  to the market  wage  in
South  Africa  to be close  to 1.
1  7The  elasticity  of the  children's  attendance  of ECD  centers  with  the respect  to cost of care  is high.
While  we know  of no studies  that  calculated  comparable  elasticities  in Kenya,  or in any other  African
country,  the  results  from  Uganda's  National  Commitment  to Basic  Education  project  (World  Bank  2000)
18households in Kenya are quite sensitive to the costs of care and that policies that affect child care
costs can have a pronounced impact on household behavior.
An increase in the wage rates of household members other  than the mother has a strong effect
on their level of labor force participation. In 10.4 percent of households, other household members
would enter the labor market. This increase in wages positively affects the use of child care facilities,
although that effect is small compared with changes in mothers' wages or in costs of care. The
percentage of households in which all the school-age children attend school would also increase.
Simulating  the effect of household characteristics  on the household behavior reveals that an
increase in household income does not significantly affect the level of mothers' employment and
participation of children in ECD (Table 8). It raises the level of children's school attendance,  but this
effect is small. Single  mothers are more likely to work than married women with children. According
to the model, about 65 percent of single mothers participate in the labor force compared with 51.3
percent of married mothers. Households headed by a single mother are more likely to use ECD
facilities and have lower rates of children's school enrollment. We also found that the educational
level attained by the household head positively influences mothers' labor force participation, the use
of outside home child care facilities, and children's school attendance.  Mothers in larger households
are less likely to work, larger households are more likely to use child care facilities, and the level of
school enrollment among school-age children is higher in such households.
Gender  differences  in children's  school  enrollment
The model and estimations  we presented above allow  us to analyze  gender differences in households'
demand for education.  The heterogeneity in the household approach  to school investment in girls and
boys may mask the results presented above. To test how differently various parameters affect the
schooling  of children of different genders,  we re-estimate our model of household demand  separately
for girls and for boys. For these estimations we create two new binary variables equal to 1 if all
school-age girls (boys) in the household are in school and equal to 0 otherwise. We estimate the
indicate  that  when  free  schooling  was  introduced  in Uganda  in 1997,  primary  school  enrollment  immediately
doubled  from  2.6 to 5.2 million  children  and  reached  6.5 million  in 1999.  This  result  corresponds  to
elasticities  comparable  with  those found  in this paper.
19school enrollment  equation simultaneously  with other three demand  equations in the system  on the
whole sample  of households  with small  children, but the  contribution  of the schooling  equation to the
likelihood  function is different from unity only for observations  of households with school-age  girls
(boys). The simulated probabilities  of school enrollment  are shown in Table 9.18
There are striking differences  in the effects of increased maternal wages and costs of child
care on the school enrollment of boys and girls. While a 10 percent increase in mothers' wages
reduces  girls' enrollment  by 8.8 percent (elasticity  of-1.5), that increase in wages actually  raises  the
school attendance  of boys  by 11  percent (elasticity  of 1.27).  These  results may be driven by different
interactions of income and substitution effects in households' decisions about girls' and boys'
schooling.  Higher wages for the mother  would increase  household  income and induce  the household
to consume  more schooling  for its children. At the same  time higher  wages  would make the time the
mother spends  at home  more expensive,  and the household  may decide  to substitute for the mother  in
some  home production  activities by relying  on other  household  members.  For boys  the income effect
clearly  dominates  the substitution  effect.  Higher  wages ofthe mother  increase  boys' school  enrolment.
For girls  the situation is the opposite.  In response  to an increase  in mothers' wages,  households  would
replace mothers with adolescent girls in home production activities, and girls' school enrollment
would drop.
The effect of an increase in the cost of care confirms  this hypothesis. A 10 percent increase
in child care costs drops girls' school attendance rate by 3.3 percent whereas the effect of such an
increase  on boys' school enrollment  is insignificant.  Higher  costs of care would lower the household
demand  for paid  care. To care  for its small  children,  the household  may either  reduce the labor  supply
of the mother or use other household members as child care providers. As we can see from the
simulation,  the household decides  to sacrifice  girls' schooling  and employ them in home production
to allow the mother to work for wages. We observe no such effect in the case of school-age  boys.
Again, as in the case of a change in maternal wage rates, the effect of the changes  in child care costs
for all children's school enrollment  results from a combination  of the decline  in enrollment  for girls
and the slight increase in school enrollment  for boys.
18 The  estimated  coefficients  for  these  separate  estimation  for boys  and girls  are  available  from  the
authors.
207. Conclusions  and policy implications
The estimations of the joint model of household demand system confirm the predictions of the
theoretical  model  developed  in this paper.  We found  that economic  incentives  have  a powerful effect
on the work behavior  of women with children in Kenya.  The level of wages  available  to them and the
costs of child care  can  be expected  to affect women's labor  force  participation.  Child care  costs affect
which child care arrangement households choose. When the costs of formal care are high, this
discourages  households  from using outside-home  child care and increases  the number  of households
that rely on home-provided  care. High child care costs were also found to have a negative  effect on
the level of maternal  employment.
Both the cost of care and the level of wages available to the mother affects older children's
school enrollment. However, these factors have different effects on boys' and girls' schooling.
Whereas  an increase  in mothers' wages raises  the school participation  of boys,  it depresses  the school
enrollment of girls. Higher prices of child care have no significant effect on boys' schooling  and
significantly  decrease  the number of girls at school.
We  found that the single  mothers  are more likely  to work  than married women with children.
Households  with single  mothers  rely  more often  on paid  child care,  and such households  would be the
most affected by changes in child care costs.
Changes  in household  nonwage  income  have  no significant  effect on  the level of mothers'  labor
force participation  or on children's schooling  or the use of outside-home child care facilities. From
this result we can conclude that nontargeted subsidies to households with children would be less
effective  than  other  policies  in increasing  levels  of  maternal  employment,  school  enrollment,  and small
children's participation  in ECD programs.
Government subsidies for child care may increase the number of mothers who work, thus
increasing  the incomes of poor households  and lifting some families  out of poverty.  They  would  also
have a positive effect on the school participation  of older girls in the household.
The results of this study  clearly  indicate  that in addition to increasing the future  productivity
of children, low-cost  ECD programs would likely produce  the twin effects of releasing  the mothers'
time for market work and allowing older girl siblings to participate in school. Thus, well-targeted
21ECD programs may be seen as optimal economic  investments that affect both the current and future
welfare of households with small children.
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24Table 1: Percent of working mothers, by number of small children in the household
Number of children  Age  of the mother in years
0-6  years old  18-25  26-35  36-45  46 +
1  29  46  34  28
2  27  32  30  22
3  24  27  24  21
4+  29  27  24  18
Table 2: Probability of the mother's working, by total household size
Household  size  Age  of the  mother  in years
18-25  26-35  36-45  46  +
2  0.63  0.81  0.67  0.27
3  0.35  0.53  0.54  0.32
4  0.24  0.42  0.51  0.32
5  0.27  0.33  0.40  0.32
6+  0.24  0.29  0.27  0.21
Table 3: Probability of small children attending  ECD  center,  by the number  ofelderly in the household
Number of elderly  Total  Boys  Girls
persons
0  0.12  0.12  0.12
1  0.10  0.10  0.10
2  0.09  0.04  0.13
3+  0.08  0.03  0.06
Table 4: Rates of labor force participation of various age-gender groups
Age group  Women  Women  Women  Men
with  children  with  no children  total
18-25  0.27  0.20  0.23  0.28
26-35  0.33  0.44  0.35  0.70
36-45  0.30  0.36  0.31  0.68
46+  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.54
Total  0.30  0.26  0.28  0.53
25,Table 5: Summary  statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables.
Mean STD  Mean STD
Dependent  variables  Explanatory  variables
Mother's work status  0.53 binary  Nuclear family and other relatives  0.05  binary
Younger children in ECD center  0.18 binary  Other types of households with children  0.07 binary
All children 8-16 years old are in  0.64 binary Agricultural income  0.03  0.09
school')
All girls 8-16 years old are in school 2)  0.68 binary Nonagricultural income  0.12  0.86
All boys 8-16  years old are in school  3  0.71 binary  Characteristics  of the head
Other household members' work status  0.75 binary  Age of household head  41.36  12.27
Explanatory variables  Age of household head squared/100  18.60  11.85
Log of mother's wage  6.62  0.35  Gender of household head  0.80 binary
Log of other household members' wage  6.48  2.13  Education of the household head  0.02  0.13
Log of average  expenditure  on child care  4.42  0.24  Characteristics  of the mother
Log of quality-adjusted cost of care  4.26  0.68  Mother's age  32.15  8.68
Lagged average wage per locality  6.87  0.47  Mother's age squared/lO0  11.08  63.95
Household  characteristics  Preschool  education  0.01 binary
Total household size  6.84  2.81  Standard 1-8 (below CPE)  0.28 binary
Number of children 0-2 years old  0.70  0.67  Cert. of primary education (CPE)  0.15 binary
Number of children 3-5 years old  0.96  0.65  Junior sec. ed. (Form  1-4)  0.10 binary
Number of children 6-7 years old  0.72  0.65  Cert. of secondary ed. (KCSE)  0.07 binary
Number of children 8-12 years old  1.20  1.12  Trade test certificate  0.01 binary
Number of children 13-16 years old  0.63  0.88  Other postsecondary ed.  0.01 binary
Share of adult males in the household  0.16  0.10  University and above  0.00 binary
Share of adult females in the household  0.22  0.09  No education  0.37 binary
Share of elderly persons in the  0.01  0.05
household
'  Average is calculated on a sample of households with children age 8-16.
2) Average is calculated on a sample of households with girls age 8-16.
3) Average is calculated on a sample of households with boys age 8-16.
26Table 6(a): Independent  estimation of the system of household demand equations (probits)
Mother's  Children  Children  Other household
work status  in ECD centers  at school  members' work
Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.
Log of mother's wage  3.936**  1.831  4.627**  0.905  0.788  2.140  -0.685  0.978
Log of other's  wage  0.234  0.167  0.164  0.437  0.290  0.185  2.574***  0.210
Log expenditure on care  -0.529**  0.299  -2.869***  0.821  -1.446***  0.333  -0.074  0.367
Household characteristics
Household size  -0.594  1.366  6.431*  0.989  3.866  4.226  2.035  1.403
Number of children 0-2  0.028  0.390  -1.374***  0.064  -1.221*  0.779  1.284*  0.711
# children 3-5  0.691  0.440  -0.431  0.985  -0.313  1.062  0.815  0.843
# of children 6-7  -0.009  0.478  3.022***  0.064  -0.251  1.032  -1.072  0.807
#of  children 8-12  -0.109  0.296  -1.450**  0.627  -1.852**  0.714  -0.304  0.620
# of children 13-16  0.121  0.309  -1.393**  0.060  -2.468***  0.716  -0.082  0.769
Share of adult males  -0.091  0.361  -1.354***  0.512  -0.389  0.687  0.704  0.459
Share of adult females  0.042  0.350  -1.211***  0.462  0.073  0.682  0.505  0.496
Share of elderly  -0.245  0.622  -0.950  0.952  -0.395  0.899  0.830  0.823
Share of children  Reference
Single-mother household  0.419***  0.129  0.059  0.550  -0.029  0.150  -1.060***  0.148
Single-mother and other  0.361**  0.159  0.089  0.590  0.002  0.202  -1.131***  0.172
Nuclear family household  Reference
Nuclear family and other  0.091  0.081  0.170*  0.112  -0.012  0.100  0.342***  0.119
Other types of households  0.093  0.099  0.009  0.303  0.028  0.140  0.271**  0.147
Nonwage household income  0.223  1.020  1.000  1.000  2.308  3.122  9.560**  3.303
Nonwage household income  1.849  1.023  1.974  1.000  1.848  1.315  0.641  1.026
Age of household head  -1.518  1.020  -1.741  0.794  -0.580  1.328  2.262**  0.747
Age of head squared*l00  1.038  1.037  0.730  0.811  0.455  1.324  -3.261**  0.728
Gender of household head  -0.388***  0.095  0.017  0.379  -0.193*  0.121  0.037  0.130
Education of household head  3.282***  0.604  2.203**  0.982  6.376***  0.727  3.278  0.761
Characteristics of the mother
Mother's  age  0.723***  0.169  2.391  0.885  4.722  2.201  0.018  0.764
Mother's  age squared* 100  -0.803  0.212  -1.631  0.944  -3.810  2.718  1.295  0.936
No formal education  Reference
Preschool education  0.265  0.215  0.463*  0.996  0.924****  0.268  0.006  0.276
Standard 1-8  0.063  0.088  0.105  0.084  0.621***  0.106  0.182  0.074
Cert. of primary education  0.188***  0.096  0.169  0.097  0.815***  0.119  0.363**  0.190
Junior secondary education  0.235  0.145  0.013  0.118  0.815***  0.176  0.457***  0.204
Cert. of secondary education  -0.009  0.205  -0.039  0.145  0.331  0.245  0.382**  0.154
Trade  test certificate  -0.163  0.351  -0.361  0.994  0.316  0.452  0.174  0.439
Other postsecondary educ.  0.402  0.325  -0.235  0.249  0.346  0.390  0.488  0.328
University and above  -0.426  0.510  -1.177  0.999  0.338  0.698  0.010  0.545
Mean salary in the district  -3.837***  0.383  4.641***  0.725  3.442***  0.453  0.143  0.475
Constant  -0.716  0.988  -5.511  0.771  -2.847**  1.229  -1.671  0.632
N  11T  g 1  .ikPlihnndl  6645  1-4235  601  4735  [-2157  661  6645  f-2843-89]  6645  [-24402961
Note: Average  per  locality  household  expenditure  on child care  is used  as a proxy for cost of child
care.
27Table 6(b): Simultaneous estimation of the system of household demand equations
Mother's  Children  Children  Other household
work status  in ECD centers  at school  members' work
Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.
Log of mother's wage  7.637**  3.344  4.936**  1.655  3.118  5.411  -0.096  3.199
Log of other's wage  0.403  0.281  0.193  0.194  0.221  0.335  8.006***  1.304
Cost of child care  -0.886*  0.536  -3.229***  0.401  -1.721**  0.613  0.065  0.472
Household  characteristics
Household size  -0.955  5.119  7.824**  3.657  9.805  8.025  5.754  4.905
Number of children 0-2  -0.079  1.004  -1.623**  0.700  -2.294**  1.389  1.527*  0.939
# children 3-5  1.137  1.004  -0.567  0.674  -1.075  1.343  1.008  0.907
#of  children  6-7  -0.036  1.000  3.242***  0.691  -0.662  1.377  -1.544*  0.935
# of children 8-12  -0.223  0.895  -1.700**  0.632  -3.812**  1.365  -0.538  0.860
# of children 13-16  0.075  0.904  -1.659*  0.654  -4.197***  1.296  -0.207  0.865
Share of adult males  -0.172  0.774  -1.557**  0.569  -0.404  1.218  1.054  0.726
Share of adult females  -0.007  0.713  -1.436**  0.511  -0.441  1.185  1.274*  0.687
Share of elderly  -0.829  1.107  -1.100  0.829  0.015  1.734  1.781*  0.994
Share of children  Reference
Single mother household  0.696***  0.234  0.070  0.168  -0.230  0.262  -1.628***  0.220
Single mother and other  0.507**  0.284  0.116  0.200  -0.339  0.338  -1.708***  0.256
Nuclear family household  Reference
Nuclear family and other  0.167  0.151  0.200**  0.097  -0.082  0.165  0.479***  0.150
Other types of households  0.187  0.187  0.016  0.134  -0.113  0.205  0.394**  0.166
Nonwage household income  0.065  2.205  1.262  1.811  10.288*  6.604  8.905**  4.711
Nonwage household income  2.750  3.724  2.179  2.155  6.739*  3.256  -0.046  3.010
Age of household head  -3.187*  2.044  -2.053  1.399  -0.607  2.234  1.680  1.710
Age of head squared* 100  2.350  2.011  0.906  1.461  0.042  2.159  -3.333**  1.747
Gender of household head  -0.845***  0.224  0.015  0.131  -0.441**  0.214  -0.022  0.160
Education of household head  6.277***  1.378  2.452***  0.814  12.254***  1.772  1.571  1.324
Characteristics  of the mother
Mother's age  1.404***  0.377  2.937  2.148  3.260  4.476  1.867  2.760
Mother's age squared  -1.564***  0.459  -2.144  2.719  -0.795  5.409  -0.684  3.470
No formal education  Reference
Preschool education  0.493  0.391  0.539**  0.277  1.820**  0.605  -0.003  0.340
Standard 1-8  0.090  0.157  0.120  0.092  1.106***  0.297  0.248  0.159
Cert. of primary education  0.372**  0.179  0.197**  0.102  1.515***  0.328  0.495***  0.177
Junior secondary education  0.469*  0.268  0.018  0.145  1.474**  0.506  0.570**  0.262
Cert. of secondary education  0.039  0.356  -0.014  0.196  0.624  0.612  0.436  0.375
Trade test certificate  -0.447  0.628  -0.386  0.373  0.356  1.004  0.010  0.607
Other postsecondary educ.  0.710  0.548  -0.231  0.311  1.151  0.904  0.609  0.620
University and above  -0.747  0.925  -1.275** 0.565  1.068  1.725  -0.318  0.869
Mean salary in the district  -3.061***  1.010  5.470***  0.598  8.411***  1.487  -0.256  0.633
Constant  0.104  1.854  -6.137***  1.033  -10.744***  3.200  0.832  1.863
N [Log Likelihood]  6645 [-11327.741
Note:  Average  per locality  household  expenditure  on child  care  is used  as a proxy  for cost of child
care.
28Table 7: Simulation  of the effects  of various  policies on the  household  behavior  (SPFIML  estimation)
Simulated  probability
Increase  by 10%  Mother's  Children  Children  Other  household
work status  in ECD centers  at school  members' work
Baseline  53.1()  17.2(  )  64.3  75.5
Mother's wage
rate  Baseline  62.3(*)  24.9(*)  67.3  76.4
+ 10%
Elasticity  1.48  3.09  0.45  0.12
Baseline  52.9(*)  17.7(  )  63.5(*)  75.5
Cost of child care
Baseline  51.1(')  13.6(*)  61.3(*)  75.6
+ 10%
Elasticity  -0.35  -3.01  -0.36  0.01
Baseline  52.9  17.8  63.5  75.5
Cost of child care
Fully  63.2  78.7  77.5  74.9
subsidized
Other household  Baseline  52.9  17.7  63.8°*  70.5°'
members' wage  Baseline  53.3  17.9  64.1(*)  80.4("
+ 10%
Elaticiy  0.08  .011  0.05  1.23
Note:  °  means  that  the corresponding  estimated  coefficient  is significant  with  at least  90% probability.
29Table 8: Simulation of the effects of various household characteristics on household behavior
(SPFIML estimation)
Simulated probability
Mother's  Children  Children  Other household
work status  in ECD centers  at school  members' work
Baseline  52.9  17.7  63.8(*)  75.61*
Household
nonwage income  Baseline  53  17.7  63.9( )  75.6("
+ 10%
ElIJiy  0Q2  0.00  0.02  :f  A  A0.00
Single  mother  65.3( )  19.3  60.9  46.6(7
Household type
All  other  51.3(')  17.4  64.3  77.6(*
Education of  Baseline  53.1( )  17.4()  67.1(*)  75.9
household head
Baseline  + 1  54.3(')  17.9(*)  68.9( )  76.2
:  . . f  S  0  8  . 0  :  .
Elasticity  0.22  0.0;  0.2  0,04
Household size  Baseline  53.0  17.9  62.1  75.6
Baseline  + 1  52.4  19.5  63.5  75.6
E0.22  0 00
Note: °  means that the corresponding estimated coefficient is significant with at least 90% probability.
30Table 9: Simulation of the effects of various policies on children schooling (SPFIML estimation)
Simulated  probability  of a household's  having
all its children  in school
Increase  by 10%  Girls  Boys  All  children
8-16  years  old  8-16  years old  in  school
Baseline  67.3(')  75.5(')  64.3
Mother's  wage
rate  Baseline  + 10%  58.5(  )  86.5(  )  67.3
Elasticity  -1.S  1,27  0.  4'
Baseline  68.1(')  70.2  63.5()
Cost  of child
care  Baseline  + 10%/o  64.8(  )  70.3  61.3()
Elasticity  -0.51  0`01  -0.36
Other  household  Baseline  68.7  70.3  63.8
members' wage  Bsln  0
member  e  Baseline+  IO%  70.0  70.7  64.1
Elasticit  a  9  - 0.()6  0,,
Note:  (')  means  that  the corresponding  estimated  coefficient  is significant  with  at least  900/O  probability.
31Table 10: Simulation of the effects of various policies on children schooling (SPFIML estimation)
Simulated probability ofa household's having
its children in ECD programn
Increase by 10%  Girls  Boys  Either children
3-6 years old  3-6 years old  in ECD program
Baseline  13.9  13.7  17.2('
Mother's wage
rate  Baseline + 10%  23.2  18.3  24.9('
Elasticity  0  f  4.RJ  ;01f  fO  2z5V  3.09
Baseline  14.1  14.1  17.7°')
Cost of child
care  Baseline + 10%  10.4  10.9  13.6°*
Elasticity  __  -3.42  -402.93  . 3.
Other household  Baseline  14.2  14.1  17.9
members' wage
Baseline + 10%  13.9  14.5  19.5
Note: °  means that the corresponding estimated coefficient is significant with at least 90% probability.
32Appendix
In the SPFIML  estimation  the following  functional  forms were assumed in estimating  the probability
weights Pk, Pi, and P,,, and the points of support for factors VI, V2, and V3:
P..  exp(bmn) _ n=1,...,N-1  P.in  =  1
1+  exp(bm)  1+  exp(bmn)
Vmn  =exp(amn  )  n =  2,...,  N  - I  Vm.  = O; VmN  l
1 + exp(amn)
33Table Al:  Simultaneous  estimation of the system of household demand equations
Mother's  Children  Children  Other household
work status  in ECD centers  at school  members' work
Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.
Log of mother's wage  30.685*** 11.010  0.693  2.477  0.080  9.558  -2.332  5.651
Log of others'  wage  0.692  0.666  0.406  0.261  0.798  0.639  5.544  6045
Cost of child care  -3.517  4.806  -0.111  0.260  -0.607  0.443  1.497***  0.322
Household characteristics
Household size  -23.916  34.559  8.957*  5.429  13.333  14.303  13.736**  7.264
Number of children 0-2  1.816  8.520  -2.292  1.209  -3.449  2.888  -0.285  1.352
# children 3-5  5.732  7.437  -0.606  0.847  -0.852  2.097  -0.056  1.330
#of  children 6-7  5.046  6938  3.377**  1.164  -2.583  2.677  -2.660**  1.267
#ofchildren8-12  2.591  6.793  -2.031*  0.997  -4.025  3.206  -1.792  1.191
#ofchildren  13-16  3.764  5.100  -2.008*  1.070  -5.517  3.842  -1.821*  1.116
Share of adult males  1.316  5.508  -2.150  0.977  -1.814  1.854  -0.107  0.955
Share of adult females  2.600  4.521  -1.560  0.813  -0.708  1.677  -0.278  1.064
Share of elderly  2.154  7.285  -1.861  1.266  -1.641  2.380  0.907  1.652
Share of children  Reference
Single mother household  0.163  0.607  0.116  0.229  -0.265  0.639  -2.162***  0.324
Single mother and other  -1.142  0.882  0.014  0.262  -0.488  0.878  -2.185***  0.375
Nuclear family household  Reference
Nuclear family and other  -0.046  0.510  0.134  0.130  0.087  0.251  0.270**  0.196
Other types of households  -0.005  0.612  -0.282  0.195  -0.668  0.552  0.468  0.204
Nonwage household income  18.600*  9.573  7.594  5.987  8.894  11.715  1.630  7.872
Nonwage household income  -2.705  6115  2.295  2.393  1.265  5.234  -2.422**  1.160
Age of household head  -6.793  7.372  -1.864  1.947  3.771  3.486  -1.755  2.341
Age of head squared*100  2.298  6525  0.957  1.958  -3.883  3.283  -0.608  2.265
Gender of household head  -2.256**  1.148  0.033  0.188  -0.353  0.528  -0.298  0.206
Education of household head  10.118  6325  1.863*  1.095  6.015*  3.481  0.353  4.250
Characteristics of the mother
Mother's age  33.105**  11.387  6.430*  3.778  -1.426  8.606  7.050**  3.535
Mother's  age squared  -35.860** 13.369  -7.265*  4.520  2.876  11.081  -6.406  4.331
No fonnal education  Reference
Preschool education  1.002  1.154  0.396  0.333  1.353  1.114  0.078  0.352
Standard 1-8  -0.700  0.609  0.207  0.161  0.750**  0.374  0.269  0.225
Cert. of primary education  0.139  0.491  0.469*  0.244  1.105***  0.422  0.561**  0.256
Junior secondary education  -0.553  0.726  0.293  0.255  1.035  0.663  0.516  0.507
Cert. of secondary education  -1.854*  1.018  0.415  0.350  0.033  0.932  0.661  0.691
Trade test certificate  -3.651  3.446  0.091  0.554  -1.261  1.851  -0.082  1.053
Other postsecondary educ.  -0.686  1.861  0.259  0.514  1.387  1.108  1.119  0.933
University and above  -4.495**  2.200  -0.100  0.741  -0.616  2.613  -0.019  1.454
Mean salary in the district  -8.364*  4.402  2.888**  1.108  7.713  5.908  1.450  0.876
Constant  -15.295**  7.269  -4.485***  1.396  -8.535  9.424  1.368  2.861
N [Log Likelihood]  3846 [-6777.1 11
Note:  Average  per locality  quality  adjusted  cost  of child  care  is used  as a proxy  for cost  of child  care.
34Table A2: Simulation  ofthe effects  of various policies on the household  behavior  (independent  probit
estimations)
Simulated probability
Increase by 10%  Mother's  Children  Children  Other household
work status  in ECD centers  at school  members' work
Baseline  53.2(')  17.2(')  64.1  75.4
Mother's
wage rate  Baseline  + 10%  62.7(*)  25.4(*)  65.6  74.5
Elasticity  1.52  3.23  0.23  -0.12
Baseline  53.1(  17.7(*l  63.5(*)  75.5
Cost of
child care  Baseline  + 10%  51.8(*)  13.7(*)  60.7(')  75.4
Elasticity  -0.25  -2.92  -0.46  -0.01
Baseline  53.1('-  17.7("  63.5( )  75.5
Cost of
child care  Fully  subsidized  65.1( )  77.1(')  86.3(*)  76.5
Other  Baseline  53.0  17.6  64.0  75.7(*)
household
members  Baseline  + 10%  53.5  17.8  64.6  79.8
wage
.lasticity  0.09  0.11  0.09  0.51
Note: (*)  means that the corresponding estimated coefficient is significant with  at least 90%
probability.
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